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The European government debt crisis began in May 2010 in the wake of Greece’s public fi -
nance problems, which sharply raised the yield demanded by investors from Greek govern-
ment securities and fi nally prompted a request for international fi nancial support. The distrust 
and strains spread rapidly to those euro area countries exhibiting greatest weakness, be it in 
their fi scal position or as a consequence of the macroeconomic imbalances which had built 
up. In autumn 2010 the Irish government also had to request fi nancial assistance from the EU 
and the IMF in a fresh outbreak of tensions in sovereign risk markets. In April 2011 it was the 
turn of the Portuguese authorities to ask for help following a surge in the interest rates on their 
debt, although on this occasion the strains did not spread to other sovereigns as had occurred 
in previous cases.
Perceptions of sovereign risk not only affect the public sector’s borrowing costs and its ability 
to refi nance its debt on the markets, but also infl uence other economic agents’ borrowing 
costs. Consequently, it is important to have a tool to identify which factors are behind the re-
cent increase in sovereign risk in euro area economies.
Usually sovereign risk is determined by looking at the difference between the interest rates on 
sovereign bonds of the same maturity and characteristics issued by two different countries. 
Thus, what is actually being measured is a differential risk. Sovereign credit default swaps 
(CDSs) provide an alternative means for estimating individual sovereign risk.2 Before the crisis, 
sovereign CDS markets were not liquid enough to adequately measure developed economies’ 
sovereign risk. Following the outbreak of the crisis, however, there was a sharp increase in 
premium quotes and in trading volumes, which doubled. According to BIS data, in the fi rst half 
of 2010 sovereign CDSs accounted for 13% of total CDSs, whereas at the beginning of the 
crisis (the second half of 2007) this percentage stood at only 6%3.
A CDS is an OTC contract (over-the-counter or non-exchange traded contract) which is very 
similar to insurance, whereby a buyer (of protection against sovereign risk) pays a fi xed amount 
(the CDS premium) until maturity of the CDS or the occurrence of the “credit event”, which for 
a sovereign CDS would be the equivalent of the issuer State defaulting on its payment com-
mitments.4 If this occurs before the CDS matures, the seller of the protection pays compensa-
tion to the buyer.5 Thus, the premium paid by the buyer of a CDS can be decomposed into two 
basic components [see, for example, Pan and Singleton (2008)]: an expected loss, which ac-
cording to available estimates [Remolona et al. (2007), for example] tends to be relatively small 
and a sovereign risk premium.6
Introduction
1. This article is based on How can we interpret sovereign CDS spreads during the crisis?, a forthcoming Working Paper of 
the Banco de España by the same authors and Szabolcs Sebestyén (Universidad Europea de Madrid). For more details of 
the data used and of the methodological characteristics, see the Working Paper. 2. See Blanco et al. (2005) for an analysis 
of the relationship between corporate CDS premia and the yield spreads on the underlying bonds. 3. Data from Triennial 
and semiannual surveys (Positions in global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets at end-June 2010), BIS, published in 
November 2010. 4. Default, in the case of a sovereign CDS, may include not only non-payment but also, for example, a 
restructuring of maturities or a modifi cation of interest rates. 5. Let us assume that the ten-year CDS sovereign spread of 
country X for a contract with a principal of US$ 10 million is 300 bp. This means that the buyer will pay US$ 300,000 per year 
and obtains the right to sell the bonds issued by country X at face value in case of non-payment. 6. In addition to sovereign 
risk, the CDS premium may also include a component attributable to counterparty risk and liquidity risk.
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This article analyses recent developments in sovereign CDS premia in order to study which 
type of determinants favoured the increase in sovereign risk during the crisis. It contains four 
sections in addition to this introduction. Specifi cally, the fi rst section explains the advantages 
of sovereign CDS premia compared with debt spreads for analysing sovereign risk in a situa-
tion such as the present one. Next, the results of several empirical exercises are presented in 
which changes in the CDS premia of a group of developed countries are decomposed into one 
part which relates to global factors and another part attributable to idiosyncratic factors. In the 
third section, the idiosyncratic component is separated into one part genuinely based on eco-
nomic fundamentals and another part which can be associated with contagion and/or over-
reaction to movements in other sovereigns. Lastly, the main results are presented and the 
principal conclusions summarised.
After the fi nancial turmoil began in 2007, sovereign CDS premia increased even in economies 
with a high credit rating such as the United States. Chart 1 shows the changes in these premia 
for ten-year maturities in ten OECD economies (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, 
Germany, France, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal).7 These countries were chosen in 
order to cover a varied group of euro area economies as well as a set of other developed 
countries which can act as a control group for the estimates made. As could be expected 
given the events described in the introduction, the highest increases were in the CDS premia 
of Ireland, Greece and Portugal (in all these cases, the rating agencies downgraded the rating 
of the related sovereign debt on different occasions). The lowest increases were in the United 
States, France and Germany. Therefore, there has been discrimination between assets on 
sovereign CDS markets which did not occur prior to the fi nancial crisis.
The above-mentioned developments could also be documented on the basis of the changes 
in the spreads between the interest rates of government bonds issued by the various States. 
However, there are two fundamental reasons why, in a situation such as the current one, it 
seems preferable to centre the analyses on sovereign CDS premia. Firstly, when debt spreads 
are used it is not possible, for reasons of construction, to analyse the changes in the sovereign 
risk of the reference country. Additionally, the results may depend on the country chosen for 
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7. The ten-year CDS premia were chosen because they are comparable to ten-year sovereign debt spreads. Neverthe-
less, the liquidity of this market is similar for ten-year and fi ve-year maturities.
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such a role. The second reason is of a more technical nature. In a context of fi nancial crisis, 
such as the recent one, bond yields may be “contaminated” by effects, such as investors’ 
“fl ight to quality”, which could bias the quantifi cation of sovereign risk premia downward.8
In order to analyse the possible weight of the latter argument, fi rstly a cointegration analysis 
was performed of sovereign CDS premia and of the debt spreads of these ten countries. Such 
analysis is not new in this literature [see, for example, Blanco et al. (2005)]. In principle, CDS 
premia and debt spreads should evolve in parallel so as not to generate arbitrage opportunities 
between the two markets. In other words, since the two variables are measures of sovereign 
risk, in the long term they should move on a very similar path regardless of whether in specifi c 
episodes deviations may occur that tend to be corrected subsequently.9
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 1, which compares whether each country’s CDS 
premium and the spread between the interest rate on its ten-year bond and that on the Ger-
man bond, considered as the benchmark interest rate or that corresponding to the lowest risk, 
follow the above-mentioned similar behaviour in the long term.10 As can be seen in the table, 
for the United States, France, Japan and the United Kingdom there is not a long-term relation-
ship between the two measures of sovereign risk which, however, is detected in the other 
cases. One possible interpretation is that the fl ight to quality in periods of crisis “contaminates” 
the behaviour of risk approximated by the sovereign spreads in those countries which (like the 
United States, for example) have benefi ted from such fl ight.
In the same vein, Chart 2 shows the two measures of risk for the cases of France and Spain. 
In France, where this stable long-term relationship between the two is not detected, the CDS 
premium and the interest rate spread with Germany behave differently during the periods of 
greatest virulence of the fi nancial crisis. Conversely, in the case of Spain the two variables fol-
low a very similar path during times of tension.
Country Statistic (b) P-value Test result
United States 11.23 0.20 Absence of cointegration
France 3.90 0.91 Absence of cointegration
Japan 12.60 0.15 Absence of cointegration
Spain 15.56* 0.04 Cointegration
Greece 20.74* 0.01 Cointegration
Ireland 23.04* 0.00 Cointegration
Italy 16.86* 0.03 Cointegration
Portugal 16.19* 0.03 Cointegration
United Kingdom 7.86 0.47 Absence of cointegration
COMPARISON OF SOVEREIGN CDSs AND TEN-YEAR 
SPREAD USING COINTEGRATION TESTS (a)  
TABLE 1
SOURCE:  Banco de España. 
 
a. The ten-year spread is the difference between each country's  ten-year interest rate and that on 
the German bond. 
b. The asterisk indicates a 5% level of signi?cance. 
8. These results do not mean that sovereign CDS premia are free from limitations, such as, for example, the lack of liquid-
ity in certain periods or countries. 9. Expressed in more technical jargon, although CDS premia and debt spreads are 
integrated processes which do not converge towards the mean, theoretically the differences between the two should be 
stationary processes which converge towards the mean. 10. The Johansen test is calculated for all countries except 
Germany, since the ten-year German bond is taken as a risk-free asset for calculating the spread.
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These results are confi rmed by those of an alternative experiment based on standard principal 
components analysis. When this model is used to characterise the behaviour of the premia of 
the ten sovereign CDSs, it is found that a single principal component explains 60% of the ag-
gregate variability of the premia. However, when the exercise is repeated for interest rate 
spreads, two principal components are required to explain the same proportion of the vari-
ance. Moreover, these principal components have a very specifi c structure: countries which 
have benefi ted from the fl ight to quality have a very small weight in the fi rst component, where-
as this weight is very high in the second component.
This section analyses sovereign CDS premia using two separate empirical methods. The fi rst 
examines in greater depth the principal components analysis presented above. As previously 
mentioned, the conclusion drawn from this method is that a single factor or principal compo-
nent is suffi cient to explain most of the variability of CDS premia (60%). According to the litera-
ture, changes in the common component of sovereign CDS premia must be closely related to 
developments in aggregate world-wide risk aversion11. One way of approximating such global 
risk aversion is through the implied volatility indicator of the S&P500 index known as “VIX”. The 
top left panel of Chart 3 plots the common component and the VIX.
Their behaviour is very similar until the end of 2009, that is until the sovereign strains began in 
certain European economies. Subsequently, there seems to be very little correlation between the 
two variables. Thus, it seems that the proportion of the variance of CDS premia which can be 
explained by the global component is not constant over time. Until 2009 Q4 sovereign risk had a 
much larger global component than after that quarter, when the euro area debt crisis broke out.
In order to test this hypothesis the principal components were estimated again, not for all the 
available sample period, but by repeating the exercise each week and considering, in each 
case, data which cover a period (rolling window) of ten months. The top right panel of Chart 3 
shows the results of this exercise. As can be seen, in line with other authors’ and analysts’ 
observations, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the behaviour of CDS premia 
seemed to depend on common factors. In fact, a single principal component explains around 
Decomposition of 
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11. See Longstaff et al. (2010), who analyse the common dynamics of the CDS premia of different emerging countries.
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80% of the total variation at that time. However, from end-2009, coinciding with the sovereign 
debt problems of various European economies, the importance of changes in this common 
factor diminished, giving ground to the idiosyncratic factors of each economy.
To analyse in more detail the relative weights of the common component and the idiosyncratic 
components of CDS premia, the second method used in this study consists in decomposing 
these premia by means of a (dynamic factorial) model so as to estimate the relative weights of 
three components: a common factor (associated with global drivers), a factor related to the 
level of aversion to the global risk linked to the behaviour of VIX and an idiosyncratic compo-
nent of each country.
First, it is important to observe that this methodology produces results which, at least where 
comparisons can be made, are very similar to those of the previous exercise involving principal 
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a. The common factor was calculated using principal components analysis. 
b. VIX is an index of implied volatility which proxies international risk aversion. 
c. The VIX volatility index is measured on the right-hand axis. 
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The top two panels of Chart 4 show the average contribution of each of the three factors to 
changes in CDS premia before and after, respectively, the onset of the sovereign diffi culties in 
the euro area (taken for these purposes as occurring in September 2009). In the fi rst part of 
the crisis, much of the behaviour of CDS premia was dominated by the factor associated with 
VIX (which can be interpreted as a premium related to global risk aversion) and by the common 
factor. Idiosyncratic factors scarcely had any weight (except in the case of Greece). That is to 
say, because of the importance of the common and global factors, in this period the CDS 
premia provided an approximation of sovereign risk which basically coincided with the per-
ceived global risk.
In the second stage, coinciding with the lesser global risk aversion, the factor associated 
with this risk decreased considerably. Also, two groups of countries can be distinguished 
according to composition. The fi rst group consists of the countries which have not experi-
enced severe diffi culties associated with their debt (United States, Germany, France, Japan 
and United Kingdom), in which the common factor dominates. Indeed, in the United States 
and Germany the idiosyncratic factor becomes negative, which might refl ect their role as a 
safe haven. Second, in the other countries the idiosyncratic factor plays the largest role in 
determining the behaviour of their CDSs, which demonstrates investor sensitivity to per-
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osyncratic factors suggests that these countries have room to adopt measures to reduce 
investor mistrust.
It may be asked to what extent the idiosyncratic factor of sovereign risk is directly related to 
the behaviour of the country’s fundamentals or whether, on the contrary, it refl ects possible 
contagion effects or an overreaction to external events (although the latter may also be related 
–indirectly in this case– to the economic fundamentals). A possible way of answering this 
question would be to analyse the relationship between this idiosyncratic component and the 
country’s economic fundamentals that, in theory, should explain it. However, the macroeco-
nomic variables which could be used for this purpose are not available with the frequency re-
quired for the analysis (weekly).
An indirect alternative procedure consists in calculating (in a VAR-type dynamic regression 
framework) what proportion (of the variance) of the idiosyncratic component of each country 
can be explained by the past behaviour of the idiosyncratic components of other countries. 
The bottom panel of Chart 4 shows a decomposition of this type. It can be seen that Spain is 
the country that seems to have suffered most contagion of movements in idiosyncratic factors 
from other economies, since more than 80% (of the variance) of the Spanish idiosyncratic 
component originates from the behaviour of the idiosyncratic factors of other economies. The 
behaviour of the sovereign CDS premium of countries such as Greece, Ireland or Portugal 
explains more of the behaviour of Spanish CDSs than does the past experience of the country 
itself. Italy shares with Spain this feature of being more infl uenced by other countries than by 
its own internal dynamics. By contrast, the other countries with a large idiosyncratic compo-
nent show variances explained by internal components which exceed 40%. The CDS premia 
dominated by internal factors include those of economies in which the idiosyncratic compo-
nent has a small relative weight (United States and Germany, which naturally are scarcely af-
fected by other economies).
This study decomposes the sovereign CDS premia of ten developed economies, both from 
the euro area and outside it, into three mutually independent components: a factor common 
to all countries, a component related to global risk aversion and an idiosyncratic component 
which captures national factors affecting the market price of premia.
The results show that the sum of the common factor and the factor linked to global risk aver-
sion explains most CDS behaviour until the outbreak of the European sovereign crisis. After 
the shocks in Europe, and as risk aversion in the global markets subsided, it became possi-
ble to classify countries in two categories. First, those where the common component and 
that associated with risk aversion continue to explain most of the behaviour of the premium, 
and, second, those economies where the idiosyncratic component represents the largest 
portion of the premium, which coincide with the cases in which investors perceived greater 
vulnerability.
A more detailed study of the idiosyncratic component of each country indicates that strict-
ly national factors have played a signifi cant role in the recent behaviour of sovereign 
spreads. However, phenomena which, like contagion, are more attributable to conditions 
in third countries also seem to have operated, affecting most notably the Spanish econo-
my. In any event, the mere existence of contagion may also indicate the existence of po-
tential vulnerabilities which would have to be remedied in order to reduce the sovereign risk 
premium.
6.4.2011.
Decomposition of the 
idiosyncratic component 
of CDS premia into 
fundamental factors and 
contagion effects
Conclusions
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 142 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2011 SOVEREIGN CDS PREMIA DURING THE CRISIS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION AS A MEASURE OF RISK
BLANCO, R., S. BRENNAN and I. W. MARSH (2005). “An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation between Invest-
ment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps”, The Journal of Finance, vol. LX, No. 5.
LONGSTAFF, F., J. PAN, L. H. PEDERSEN and K. J. SINGLETON (2010). “How sovereign is sovereign risk?”, American 
Economic Journal, forthcoming.
PAN, J. and K. J. SINGLETON (2008). “Default and recovery implicit in the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads”, The 
Journal of Finance, No. 63, pp. 2345-2384.
REMOLONA, E., M. SCATIGNA and E. WU (2007). “Interpreting sovereign spreads”, Quarterly Review, BIS, March, pp. 
27-39.
REFERENCES
